Bede Rundle, WHY THERE IS SOMETHING RATHER THAN NOTHING and Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, CREATION OUT OF NOTHING: A BIBLICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND SCIENTIFIC EXPLORATION by Reichenbach, Bruce R.
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 23 Issue 1 Article 9 
1-1-2006 
Rundle, WHY THERE IS SOMETHING RATHER THAN NOTHING 
and Copan & Craig, CREATION OUT OF NOTHING: A BIBLICAL, 
PHILOSOPHICAL, AND SCIENTIFIC EXPLORATION 
Bruce R. Reichenbach 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Reichenbach, Bruce R. (2006) "Rundle, WHY THERE IS SOMETHING RATHER THAN NOTHING and Copan 
& Craig, CREATION OUT OF NOTHING: A BIBLICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND SCIENTIFIC EXPLORATION," 
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 23 : Iss. 1 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol23/iss1/9 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
BOOK REVIEWS 107 
it does not solve The Problem of the Many. It fails to solve The Problem 
because it asserts that a soul is (causally) related to a human body. Which 
human body, however? Tweedledee or Tweedledum? At this point, I think 
it is fair to point out that The Problem of the Many is a problem given 
a limited, naturalist ontology. If from the outset a metaphysician limits 
himself to sets of material simples, fusions of them, and relational Person-
Composing Conditions, then The Problem of the Many can lead to some 
pretty nutty positions. Might not such a limitation and the fact that it leads 
to a development of a view like 4DPartism constitute a reductio argument 
against the materialist view of the human person? If one were to allow 
for the existence of a soul, form, or some other unifying principle for or-
ganisms, then The Problem of the Many simply would not be a problem. 
Legion's body would be identical with Tweedledee and not Tweedledum 
because Righty, and not Lefty, would be under the influence of the relevant 
unifying principle. Hudson's refusal to acknowledge the existence of such 
a unifying principle is itself puzzling given his willingness to countenance 
the existence of God. After all, God typically unifies various aspects of the 
universe. Thus, because God creates and sustains the universe in being, 
He guides its history and that of the human persons who dwell on the 
face of the earth. Moreover, because God is just, He guarantees that each 
person receives his proper reward and punishment. If one allows such a 
being into one's ontology, is it all that implausible to think that it or some-
thing else could be the unifying principle for a human body? 
In closing, I want to correct what might be a somewhat negative im-
pression of Hudson's book and make clear that A Materialist Metaphysics of 
the Human Person is an absolutely wonderful work. The mark of a truly fan-
tastic book is not whether one agrees with it. It is whether one learns from 
it and either now understands things that one never understood before or 
understands them in a wholly clearer light. This book has that mark, and 
I would be nuts if I did not recommend it enthusiastically. Though you 
might not be nuts for not reading it, you will certainly be intellectually 
worse off.l 
NOTE 
1. I want to thank J. P. Moreland and Dean Zimmerman for reading parts 
of this review. 
Why there is Something rather than Nothing, by Bede Rundle. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2004. Pp. 204. $42 (Cloth). Creation out of Nothing: 
A Biblical, Philosophical, and Scientific Exploration, by Paul Copan and Wil-
liam Lane Craig. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004. Pp. 280. $20 
(Paper). 
BRUCE R. REICHENBACH, Augsburg College 
While these two tightly reasoned books provide very different answers to 
the question, Why is there something rather than nothing, the philosophical 
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arguments they address are surprisingly similar. The resulting counterpoint 
arguments are worthy of attention. 
Copan and Craig's (C&C) first three chapters, which rely heavily on 
citing concurring authors, present an extensive survey of the biblical, 
Jewish, and patristic texts about creation. Since these textual matters do 
not contribute to the larger philosophical argument, I will pass to the re-
maining chapters that are of more interest to readers of this journal and 
more central to the debate with Rundle. In chapter 4, for example, C&C 
explore the differences between divine creation, continuous creation, and 
conservation. After carefully considering the allegedly defective attempts 
by Phillip Quinn to differentiate these in terms of state-state causation, the 
authors explicate an agent account of causation, invoking the A-theory of 
time. They conclude that creation differs from conservation in that con-
servation but not creation presupposes a prior entity that receives the di-
vine causal activity. For his part, Rundle argues that mere continuance or 
duration, since it lacks any change, needs no causal explanation, thereby 
circumventing any need for a Thomistic type of cosmological argument 
that leads to a divine conserving cause. For Rundel that leaves only the 
question of creation in respect to divine activity. 
Chapters 6 and 7 reiterate Craig's widely known Kalam cosmological 
argument, this time tuned to show both creation (the beginning of the 
temporal series of physical events was caused) and its ex nihilo feature (no 
prior temporal physical events caused it). The a priori and a posteriori 
arguments advanced are those Craig has proposed elsewhere to show that 
the universe had a beginning. Chapter 6 defends the theses first that an 
actual infinite, which an infinite temporal regress of events would be, is 
incoherent and cannot exist, and second that one cannot form an actually 
infinite collection of things by successive addition. Both theses have been 
subjected to earlier criticisms to which the authors reply. Chapter 7 turns 
to the empirical confirmation of the thesis that the universe had a begin-
ning. Surveying the diversity of cosmogonic theories regarding the origin 
of the universe, they conclude that no viable alternative to the standard 
big bang model exists. Further, they argue, perhaps even more persua-
sive is the fact that consideration of the thermodynamics of the universe 
points to the thesis that the "universe's energy was somehow simply 'put 
in' at the creation as an initial condition" (248). They conclude their work 
with an assessment of naturalistic accounts of the origin of the universe, 
contending in part that those who hold that the universe simply arose vio-
late the standard metaphysical principle that one cannot derive something 
from nothing, or else that by invoking vacuum fluctuations naturalists ap-
peal to something that itself requires causal explanation. 
The philosophical portion of C&C's book contains little that the authors 
have not argued elsewhere. Hence, its merit consists in bringing together 
the textual and philosophical data to make a consistent and persuasive 
case for creation ex nihilo. 
Rundle, while only once referring to Craig, constructs a philosophical 
counterpoint. Rundle begins by wondering whether the language that 
philosophers like C&C use has any meaning, and by doing so returns 
to the positivist criticism of theological language. Although admitting 
the short comings of the verificationist program, Rundle takes from it 
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the conclusion that if the use of theological claims is not to be wholly 
metaphysical but factual and meaningful, then they should have some 
empirical content. But not only does he think that theological claims 
about God and God's activity are disbarred from being subject to em-
pirical falsification (as in Wisdom's parable), but more importantly theo-
logical statements are grounded in the non-empirical when they claim 
that an immaterial spirit acts on an empirical world, for one cannot give 
empirical meaning to an immaterial spirit acting. It is not that "God" is a 
meaningless term, for we can understand enough of its use to see where 
it is inappropriately applied. Rather, it simply lacks enough empirical 
content to give meaning to divine agency. For Rundle, the doctrine of 
analogy provides no assistance, for it fails to give enough information to 
understand how an immaterial being could possess the qualities under 
consideration. For example, we can know when mental properties apply 
to other human minds, but we have no way of telling how they apply to 
God. In sum, although he rejects the positivists' account, he thinks that 
the positivists have correctly pointed out that theological language claims 
to be factual or empirical, but in doing so the language wrongly borrows 
from the material realm in ways that are inappropriate to an immaterial 
being. This thesis of the basic incoherence of language about God under-
lies his entire presentation and is resorted to when all else fails. 
If theological language has no empirical cash value, it certainly will 
not assist in explanation, either of God's alleged continuous interaction 
with the world via miracles or of the origin of the world. The problem 
with miracles, for example, is not that unusual events occur, but with the 
inability of the theist who holds to an immaterial God to explain why 
or how God could bring about these events. Similarly, teleological argu-
ments that treat the natural laws as basic and explanatory are misguided, 
for the natural laws are neither necessary nor basic, but rather are reflec-
tions of the events that occur. What needs to be explained, then, are not 
the laws but the physical events they cover. Behind it all for Rundellurks 
the problem that since religion and science are not continuous activities, 
explanation in terms of divine activity, such as C & C engage in, is a very 
anthropomorphic, "highly primitive form of explanation" (p. 29). In effect, 
then, the two books draw battle lines over whether the theist can give any 
plausible account of divine agency. 
Interestingly enough, both Rundle and C&C adopt forms of agent cau-
sation. Criticizing a view of causation based on mere constant conjunction 
as only giving us juxtaposition, Rundle in chapter 3 argues for a notion of 
connection that involves agency and connectivity. Causation, he contends, 
is not a secret power but is visibly manifested in cutting, pulling, lifting, 
etc. When he applies this to divine agency, he contends not as Hume that 
we cannot understand a cause of the universe since we only have experi-
ence with this universe, but that we cannot intelligibly speak of an inten-
tional, causally active immaterial agent. Since intention requires a body, 
we cannot meaningfully apply causation to non-physical beings. More 
specifically, he protests that causing is doing something to something, so 
that creation ex nihilo makes no sense. Further, causation as an act occurs 
in time, but creation ex nihilo is a creation of time, not in time. In short, how 
can creation ex nihilo occur, for it violates our ordinary uses of "cause"? 
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The debate between the two books, at this point, concerns what sense 
can be made of Copan and Craig's appeal to personal explanation. C & 
C move from the Kalam argument to delineate properties that this being 
must have, one of which is being personal (providing a personal explana-
tion as over against a "scientific explanation in terms of laws and initial 
conditions" [po 253]). Their response to the objection that the theist has not 
provided a causal account is that one need not provide such an account of 
simultaneous, asymmetric causation since as it is we have no universally 
accepted account of causation. 
For Rundle, however, since "the only genuine substances are material 
substances, if there is no place for immaterial agents, there is no place for 
God" (p. 192). The notion of God, he claims, is of "uncertain intelligibil-
ity" (p. 191). The reason is that "mind" is misconstrued if used to name a 
substance (echoes of Wittgenstein). Further, while we can show how mind 
comes from matter, it is hard to show how matter comes from mind. And 
since notions of "force and energy do not allow of a non-physical applica-
tion" (p. 164), it makes little sense to speak of God as creating the material 
cosmos. In effect, if anything exists, matter exists. 
So why then is there something rather than nothing? Whereas C&C 
give a response in terms of God's creative activity, Rundle contends that 
one should not look for a particular being to resolve this question; rather 
he argues for a weaker conclusion that something simply had to exist. The 
reason is that we cannot imagine nothing, for in talking about nothing 
we are presupposing something. Even to arrive at nothing by subtraction 
supposes that there is a nothing, the "there is" indicating some location. 
Similarly, time cannot be where there was nothing, for time is co-existent 
with something. Hence, what exists encompasses all of time, so that one 
cannot say, "before the universe existed, there was nothing." There cannot 
be a before or after, and thus no room exists to accommodate a creator. So 
something had to be, something eternal that does not come into or pass 
out of existence. And this something is best thought of as matter, for we 
have much better evidence for matter than for God (as unintelligible). 
Copan and Craig rest their philosophical case for creation ex nihilo on 
the Kalam argument, which Rundle attacks in his concluding chapter. 
Craig's central philosophical contention is that an actual infinite is impos-
sible, based on a consideration of the logic of the infinite. Rundle rejects 
this, noting that there is reason (not presented), for example, for severing 
adding to the infinite (possible) from increasing the infinite (impossible). 
Thus, while both Craig and Rundle think that the results of applying the 
infinite to the actual are paradoxical, only the former thinks that this im-
plies incoherence. 
The second difference between them concerns how they view the past. 
Whereas Craig sees the infinite past as an actual infinite and hence sub-
ject to the above difficulties, Rundle sees it only as a potential infinite, 
just like the future. Rundle contends that ontologically applying "infi-
nite" to future events is no different from applying it to past events. An 
infinity of past days exists in the same way as an infinity of future days; 
one can always add another day. And in both cases, between now and 
any past or future date only a finite number of days exists. Thus, just as 
a day in the future cannot be infinitely distant from today, no day in the 
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past is infinitely distant from today. That is, we cannot say that an infi-
nitely many days have elapsed to this point. The past, like the future, is 
only potentially infinite. But though the only meaningful projections of 
the future are finite (any future day is temporally finite from now), that 
does not entail a future terminal event. Similarly, the only meaningful 
projections of the past are finite (any past day is temporally finite from 
now), but that does not entail an initial event. 
But as C&C point out, though this is true if one counts from the present 
to the past, the problem is that one has to "complete" an infinite to get to 
the present if there is no beginning. Rundle's reply that any event-a me-
teor hitting the earth n years ago-is only finitely distant does not address 
the problem of getting to the present where there is no starting point. Run-
dle mistakenly thinks that the problem is epistemic, not ontological. 
For Rundle, without an initial event, nothing comes to be and thus 
nothing needs explanation, for continuing in being is not something that 
requires explanation. Indeed, "since there is no time at which the universe 
might not have existed, it is not possible that the universe should not have 
existed, so it exists of necessity" (p. 183). So in effect, with the necessity of 
the universe we have an end to explanations. The principle of sufficient 
reason is still true; it is just that it does not apply to the universe. The 
universe is a posteriori necessary. So whereas Craig's argument rests on 
the contention that the universe must have had a beginning because there 
can be no actual infinite, Rundle contends that the universe did not have a 
beginning but is not actually infinite either. In effect, he seeks to avoid the 
dilemma with which C&C conclude their book. 
This short summary can only allude to the subtle and dialogical philo-
sophical reasoning found in both books. Since Craig has a penchant for 
engaging his opponents in debate, both in situ and in print, one might 
expect an ensuing volume where the two actually go head to head. The 
interesting question will then concern what kind of dialogue is possible 
between a Wittgensteinian and a realist. 
The Divine Lawmaker: Lectures on Induction, Laws of Nature, and the Exis-
tence of God, by John Foster. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. Pp. ix and 
191. $45 (hardcover). 
GRAHAM OPPY, Monash University 
In this fascinating book, John Foster develops a novel argument for the 
existence of God on the basis of considerations about inductive inference 
and laws of nature. The key claim that Foster defends is this: that regular-
ities in the behaviour of physical objects in different times and places are 
only satisfactorily explained on the assumption that the Judaeo-Christian 
God's causal imposition of regularities qua regularities on the physical 
universe brings it about that the operation of the physical universe is 
partly governed by natural laws. On Foster's account, for there to be a 
law of nature is for there to be a certain type of natural regularity of 
